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The Pennsylvania No-Fault Plan:
Can the Change Be Justified?
Every man, woman and child in America will be an accident victim
three times in an average lifetime.' To recover for injuries sustained,
the automobile victim presently must resort to the tort system. The tort
system relies on the premise that one who negligently causes injury to
another should compensate him for that injury. It provides full com-
pensation for medical injuries, lost wages, property damage and the
mental anguish accompanying injury in all cases where it is determined
that the claimant himself was not negligent or careless. Simply, when
the victim has done nothing to contribute to the accident and the in-
juries resulting therefrom, he is not "at fault" and therefore will be
coUJeIsdLCU by L1e perguso Wilo L ud tl accident or his- ill icedll
company. The scholarly works of the great teachers of tort law, Black-
stone, Pollack and Cooley consider the right to sue for personal injury
redress not only a civil right, but a basic civil liberty.2
The Pennsylvania legislature has before it the "Pennsylvania Motor
Vehicle Protection Plan."'3 This legislation proposes a modification of
tort recovery by providing insurance which would protect the policy-
holder, regardless of fault, from automobile accident related injuries.
It does not pay for damages caused to others by the negligence of the
policyholder, rather, it protects the policyholder himself from injury he
may suffer under any circumstances incident to an automobile accident.
Just as in medical insurance and workmen's compensation, the Penn-
sylvania Plan is based on first party coverage, i.e., your insurance pays
your expenses. The victim recovers in all cases from his own insurer
without regard to whether or not he was "at fault" as in the tort system.
The Pennsylvania Plan provides for far reaching consequences in the
Pennsylvania automobile reparation system including changes in the
operation and conduct of the entire automobile insurance industry,
regulations effecting the sale and renewal of motor vehicle insurance
policies, limitation on the amount of coverage provided by these policies,
and limitation on access to the courts by the accident victim.
This commentary will consider the objectives and possible conse-
1. Fuchsberg, Should Justice Be Rationed?, 6 TRIAL 47 (1970).
2. Dacey, "No Fault"--End of A Civilized Tort System?, 6 NEw ENG. L. REV. 79 (1970).
3. H.B. 1365, Session of 1971, Gen. Ass'y. of Pennsylvania.
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quences of the enactment of this legislation. It will examine public
opinion surveys to determine whether the policyholder considers a
reparation system based on first party coverage, regardless of negligence
by either party, worthwhile. It will look into the problems of delay in-
volved in the receipt of payment by the accident victim and draw con-
clusions as to whether or not such delay will be eliminated under the
Pennsylvania Plan. Consideration will be given to the limitations placed
on recovery for mental anguish and damage to health and well being,
which although recognized as a proper element of damage under the
tort system, is severely limited under the provisions regarding "pain and
suffering" in the plan. This commentary will consider the difficulties in-
volved in litigation both from the standpoint of the accident victim and
the courts themselves, and will examine the cost-benefit ratio under the
present system and the possible effects the Pennsylvania Plan might
have in reducing it. Finally, the constitutionality of the plan will be
seriously questioned. The Pennsylvania legislature can alter hundreds
of years of established tort principles by enacting the Pennsylvania
Plan. The question asked is: Can the change be justified?
PUBLIC OPINION
Public interest in no-fault has been growing in recent years. Both the
insurance industry and the Department of Transportation (hereinafter
referred to as D.O.T.) have completed opinion surveys to determine
whether the individual most affected by the destruction of the fault
system, the automobile insurance policyholder, actually wants a no-fault
system. The first and perhaps largest survey was conducted by the State
Farm Insurance Company. 4 It was sent to eleven million of their policy-
holders and three million responses were received. One question in
their survey asked:
[Do you feel that one] who causes the accident should have noth-
ing to do with who should pay for the loss of the people in the
accident?
Eighty-nine percent of those responding answered NO.5 This was a sur-
4. O'Connell and Wilson, Public Opinion on No Fault Auto Insurance; A Survey of the
Surveys, U. ILL. L. FORUM 307, 311 (1970).
5. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1969, at 107, cols. 5-6. Other questions asked were:(11) Driver who causes an accident, or his insurance company should pay for losses
of the other people in the accident. 94% said YES.
(8) People hurt in a car accident should be able to receive money for their medical
and hospital expenses, and for their pain and suffering. 72% said YES.
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vey sent not to the general public, but to those who bear the burden of
high insurance costs. State Farm further concluded that the responding
policyholders represented a cross section of their total insurance pop-
ulation.6 Apparently the attempt to give the public a new, equitable,
low cost, no-fault insurance is being made despite public opinion to the
contrary.
A later opinion survey was undertaken by four major automobile
insurers. The Market Facts Survey,7 after presenting a definition of no-
fault, posed the following question:
Suppose that the cost of auto insurance could be reduced some-
what by eliminating "pain and suffering" coverage from all poli-
cies. Payments would be limited to covering "economic loss" such
as doctor bills, hospital expenses and lost wages and salary. How
would you feel about the idea of cutting insurance costs somewhat
by eliminating "pain and suffering" payments?
Of those expressing an opinion, seventy-five percent were opposed. The
public does not feel no-fault recovery is a worthwhile substitute for the
rights to recovery they presently have in the tort system-even when
told insurance premiums will be reduced. The drafters of the Penn-
sylvania Plan feel premium reduction so important that section 25 of
the Pennsylvania Plan provides a mandatory rate reduction of "at least
ten percent." Yet, based on the cited opinion surveys, it appears even
this reduction would be considered unacceptable in exchange for tort
rights.
The Market Facts Survey also considered public attitude toward the
fault concept. Are accidents unavoidable or are they caused by drivers?
Furthermore, can this fault be determined? Of the one thousand, four
hundred and ninety-five responses to the Market Facts Survey, ninety-
one percent felt that accidents were caused by drivers and not by some
indeterminate force.8 The tort system is based on fault determination.
If an accident was your fault, you should be responsible for the eco-
nomic consequences. Apparently those responding to the Market Facts
6. Address by T. Morrill, Senate Antitrust Monopoly Subcommittee, Presentation on
Behalf of the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Dec. 9, 1969.
7. MARKET FACTS, INC., CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTO INSURANCE A616-A REPORT
TO ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, STATE FARM INSURANCE 13 (undated). This survey defined no fault as:
"The question of who was at fault in the accident would not be considered in the paymeni
of claims. Those responsible for an accident would have the same coverage and pro-
tection as those who were not at fault."
8. Id. at 71. 50.8% felt almost all accidents are somebody's fault if the facts are carefully
studied; 40.3% felt most accidents are the fault of drivers-someone is to blame; 6.0%
felt most accidents are unavoidable; and 2.0% thought all accidents were quirks of fate.
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Survey felt that fault was determinable. The Pennsylvania Plan re-
moves fault from the accident picture. The public, however, does not
seem to feel fault determination is a serious problem in the present tort
system.
Doubts arise as to whether the public wants a change in the tort sys-
tem. Even the D.O.T. Poll found sixty percent of the public favoring
the fault system. 9 Regardless of the demonstration of public opinion
against the no-fault concept shown in these three surveys, the Pennsyl-
vania legislature has before it a bill which will bring to the state a
comprehensive no-fault plan. It includes the restriction on amounts
recoverable for lost earnings, denial to the accident victim of recourse
to the courts, and the almost complete destruction of tort rights of
recovery for mental anguish resulting from injuries caused by another's
carelessness. An examination of legislative intent and the sections of
the Act which implement this intent provides a basis for determining
the merits of the Pennsylvania Plan.
PROMPT PAYMENT
Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Plan contains a general statement of
legislative policy. It sets forth the aims of the Plan which are imple-
mented through later sections of the Act. Section 2(2) states one aim of
the Pennsylvania Plan is "to provide prompt payment to victims of
motor vehicle accidents." Inadequacy of reparation for economic loss
has plagued the fault system. The D.O.T. Study points out that con-
sidering the total number of accidents in 1967 for economic loss of any
amount, thirteen percent received no benefits from any system. 10 Closer
examination of this thirteen percent figure suggests the possibility that
it does not present an accurate picture of the problem. Since the Study
considers all accidents and all economic loss, it fails to distinguish loss
not paid because the driver was intoxicated, grossly negligent or was
committing a serious violation of motor vehicle laws. It fails to consider
9. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES
77 (1970).
10. Id. at 89-90. Where the total number injured in auto accidents in 1967 was basis
for consideration, when total economic loss was from $1 to $999, a full 25% received no
benefits from any system, when the loss was from $1,000 to $4,999, 12% received no benefits.
In considering what benefits were received, a later D.O.T. survey compared the size of
individual economic loss with the average ratio of tort payments to that economic loss.
The recovery was invariably higher, almost by 100% in economic loss of $1 to $500 where
there was no permanent injury, and persons suffering disfigurement but who were in all
other respects similarly situated, received an average 4.3 times their economic loss. 2 U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., AUTO PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 156-63 (1970).
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the impact of comparative negligence statutes which provide recovery
not generally allowed under a strict fault system. Certainly some victims
are not compensated under the fault system, but, many of these same
victims would not be entitled to compensation even under a no-fault
plan which, as in the case of section 9 of the Pennsylvania Plan, would
prohibit recovery to the driver causing intentional harm, driving with-
out a license and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. These
victims receive nothing under either system.
Assuming that the thirteen percent who received nothing under the
tort system would now be compensated under the Pennsylvania Plan,
we might ask how the risk for this recovery would be allocated? Under
the fault system the negligent driver, the irresponsible driver and the
drunken driver create the greatest risk, i.e., they are more likely to be
at fault in an accident, therefore, they pay the highest premium. In-
surance rate structures are based on the allocation of risk. Under the
Pennsylvania Plan, a system in which your insurance pays only your
damages and not those you cause others, the insurer is concerned solely
with the possibility of loss to its insured. Thus, the person expected to
collect the most in case of an accident would have to be charged a higher
rate than the person who would collect little. The risk in the Pennsyl-
vania Plan system could be shifted from the incompetent or irresponsi-
ble driver to the person with the steady job, comfortable income and
family.
To effectuate the policy of prompt payments, section 12 of the Penn-
sylvania Plan provides that "economic loss benefits shall be paid as
damages accrue." Section 15 states that "payments shall be made within
thirty days after receipt of insurer of demand for payment." Although
the Pennsylvania Plan does not set out procedure for filing a claim with
the insurer, the Massachusetts Plan might provide us with an example
of the procedure which could be adopted. Massachusetts requires:
(a) Written description of injuries sustained.
(b) Written description of the extent of injury sustained.
(c) Written description of the treatment received.
(d) Written description of the treatment contemplated.
(e) Written authorization to enable insurer to obtain medical re-
ports."'
Should Pennsylvania use the same procedure the claimant would be
required to surrender his right of privacy and allow the insurance
11. Dacey, supra note 3, at 87.
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company to go through his prior medical history. Under the fault sys-
tem, the victim is protected by his lawyer and inquiry is allowed only
where justifiably necessary. The claimant under the Pennsylvania Plan
would be required to submit to medical examinations by physicians
selected by the insurer. Finally, any medical bills considered unreason-
able could be refused by the insurance company. The victim is placed
at the mercy of the insurer. The Pennsylvania Plan does not, however,
leave the victim without recourse for disputed claims. Section 16 of the
Plan provides for judicial determination of reasonableness of a claim
denied by the insurer.
Should the claim be considered reasonable, the insurer pays all costs
including attorneys fees, and may be required to pay penal damages.
This protects the claimant from unreasonable denial by the insurance
company of meritorious daims, but it also introduces the element of
litigation and delay in payment.
A substantial period of time can be involved before the victim
receives compensation for his injuries-the time required to litigate a
case and obtain a judgment. The Federal Judicial Center Study 2 found
that two million personal injury accidents occur each year, yet only
fifteen thousand cases are finally adjudicated. Since these fifteen thou-
sand cases arise out of two million accidents, perhaps the problem is not
as serious as it might appear. Yet for those fifteen thousand who must
wait for the final adjudication of their case, it is little consolation to
know they are a minority. This same study, authorized by the D.O.T.,
examined litigated cases closed in 1968 in selected counties around the
country, and discovered more than one-half of those cases required over
two years to reach termination. 13 The seriousness of the two year delay
cannot be minimized, and the impact of this delay could be lessened by
a form of first party coverage. No-Fault would provide this needed first
party coverage but it should be noted that a large measure of coverage is
being provided under existing insurance systems. Eighty-five percent of
medical expenses and two-thirds of wage and salary losses due to dis-
ability are covered by private or governmental programs, and for more
than one-half the population such programs cover virtually one
hundred percent of all losses.' 4 The accident victim may be forced to
12. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LITIGATION 7, 37 (1970).
13. Id. at 7.
14. J. DURKIN, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "SUBTRACTABLE BENEFITS" IN THE KEETON-O'CONNELL
PLAN (1971).
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wait two years to recover in the courts, but in the majority of cases, he
is not without recovery from some presently existing source.
The final reason payment is said to be delayed in the fault system is
inherent in the system itself. Supporters of no-fault maintain that fault
is difficult if not impossible to determine, thus, no-fault eliminates it to
enable prompt recovery. In a study conducted by Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company 5 in only 7.4 percent of the three-hundred fifty-two
cases in their sample was fault even questionable. Another study re-
vealed that seventy-five percent of automobile cases were susceptible to a
clear determination of fault on the basis of original reports and ninety
percent could be decided upon the completion of initial investigation. 16
Unfortunately, these statistics may not represent a true picture. "Fault"
is a concept involving many factors which cannot be measured or photo-
graphed, the most elusive being human error. Though these studies on
fault determination could tell us whether car A "hit" car B, they tell us
little about why accidents happen, how many of these accidents were
preventable, and how many will happen to even the most careful driver.
Yet, if the question is whether car A "hit" car B, then it can be answered
with certainty ninety-three percent of the time.
PAIN AND SUFFERING
The courts in Pennsylvania recognize that "Physical or bodily pain
and suffering caused by a wrong occasioning an injury to the person is
a proper element of damages."' 17 The late Justice Musmanno, of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, recognized that the wrongdoer must be
responsible for taking from a person what is his own to possess and re-
tain, namely health and well being.' Nevertheless, section 2 of the
Pennsylvania Plan mandates a limitation on recovery for "pain and
suffering" based on the allowance of intangible loss only when the
determination of such loss is "reasonable and appropriate." This ap-
proach seemingly restates the policy courts have followed since the
recognition of mental anguish and severe discomfort as a recoverable
element of damages. However, the Pennsylvania Plan in section 4 gives
us an interpretation of what constitutes reasonable and adequate com-
15. Marryott, Mystery of Who's At Fault Easily Solved, 3 TRIAL 41, 42-43 (Oct./Nov.
1967).
16. Marryott, Testing The Criticism of The Fault Concept, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 112,
115 (1968).
17. Schenkel v. Pittsburgh & B. Traction Co., 194 Pa. 182, 44 A. 1072 (1899).
18. Thompson v. lannuzzi, 403 Pa. 329, 169 A.2d 777, 778 (1961).
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pensation. Under the Plan, damages for pain and suffering will be
allowed incident to injury only if the injury causes death, loss of an eye
or member of the body, permanent disability, partial disability of
seventy percent or more, or permanent, severe, and irreparable dis-
figurement. This provision severely limits recovery for pain and suf-
fering. It prohibits recovery for loss of internal organs, loss of
consortium, pre-natal injuries, loss of eyesight, loss of hearing, brain
damage, severe burns or herniated discs. These are injuries which can
bring pain and incapacity for a lifetime, yet they will go without legal
remedy. The requirement of seventy percent disability can have one of
two consequences: it will either eliminate pain and suffering recovery.
almost entirely, or it will flood the courts with suits to determine the
degree of incapacity which will fulfill the seventy percent requirement.
The question of whether a victim is "severely disfigured" will now be
answered by the courts.
Of every insurance dollar, twenty-one and one-half cents is paid for
pain and suffering or "general damages."' 19 Not only do these damages,
make up a large part of the insurance dollar, but thirty-four percent of
all payments made in the automobile inurance system were amounts
paid in excess of economic loss to persons who suffered neither perma-
nent disfigurement nor permanent impairment.20 The drafters of the
Pennsylvania Plan recognized this cost factor and concluded elimina-
tion of pain and suffering will reduce costs. The auto victim is not
getting this cost reduction without surrendering something for these
lower costs. Under the Pennsylvania Plan persons will be forced to
endure pain and suffering and inconvenience through no fault of their,
own and but for the carelessness of another individual. The accident
victim would be required to receive the aforementioned unrecoverable
injuries and accept as compensation only the difference between the
insurance premium under the "old system" and the premium under no
fault. Even if the savings are considerable, the accident victim has given
up an established right under the law. The fault system allows individ-
uals to be treated as individuals and allows human beings to assess the
injury suffered by human beings. The Pennsylvania Plan reduces the
principle of pain and suffering to a theory we will occasionally read
about, but will see applied very little to the compensation of accident
victims..
19. N.Y.S. INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . . FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 35-36 (1970).
20. 2 PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS, supra note 10, at 18.
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COURTS
According to the D.O.T. study conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center, two hundred and twenty thousand motor vehicle accident cases
were filed in 1968.21 Motor vehicle accident litigation consumed seven-
teen percent of both civil and criminal judicial resources, and the cost
to the taxpayer was an estimated 133.7 million dollars to operate a
court system to adjudicate these cases. 22 The Pennsylvania Plan in
section 2(5) declares that the policy of the plan is to "reduce the need to
resort to lawsuits and litigation" thus relieving some of this tremendous
workload caused by the adjudication of automobile cases. The D.O.T.
study presents what apparently is a serious problem. However, two
questions must be asked: How serious is the problem of congestion, and
will the Pennsylvania Plan really reduce congestion in the courts?
The D.O.T. survey, in compiling statistic on automobile litigation,
considered civil and criminal adjudication as one element. No-fault will
have no effect on criminal actions resulting from automobile accidents.
Of those cases involving automobile liability claims, ninety-four percent
are settled without suit being filed, four percent result in suits that are
settled without trial, and only two percent result in trial with a final
verdict.23 The delay and congestion which is caused by resort to the
judicial system, furthermore, is confined to only fifteen metropolitan
areas in six states, while thirty-two states have no court delay whatever.24
In Pennsylvania, the only area of major delay was Philadelphia and they
reduced a twenty-four to thirty month backlog to thirty days by the use
of arbitration in automobile cases where the amount in controversy was
$3,000 or less. 25 Though court congestion presents an obstacle to the
accident victim, one might question whether the problem is serious
enough to justify the destruction of tort remedies by the imposition of
no-fault.
Assuming the tort system puts an unjustifiable strain on our already
crowded courts, we must ask: Will the Pennsylvania Plan reduce the
number of automobile cases in the courts? Past experience shows that
21. FEDERAL JuDIcIAL CENTER, supra note 12, at 7.
22. Id.
23. Martin, Morality and the Fault System, 40 Mss. L.J. 485 (1964).
24. Ross, D.R.I. Studies Refute Court Delay Claims of Critics, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 46,
47 (1969).
25. Ryan, Arbitration Cuts Philadelphia Backlog, 10 FOR THE DEFENSE 42 (June 1969).
Auto liability claimants who sustained economic losses of $1500 or less and $2500 or less
represent cumulatively 93.1% and 96.3% respectively of all claimants. D.O.T. Study, supra
note 9, at 90.
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insurance companies still dispute the injury itself, the extent of injury,
whether it was causally connected to the accident, and whether medical
bills are reasonable. 2 Much time in court is presently devoted to de-
ciding these issues-issues which must of necessity arise under the
Pennsylvania Plan. They will be disputed and ultimately decided by the
courts. The Pennsylvania Plan may have anticipated this problem by
including a section calling for arbitration procedures in section 9.
Unfortunately the only requirement contained in the Plan is that these
procedures be "appropriate." More significant are sections 16 and 17,
which provide recourse to the courts for the determination of what
would constitute "reasonable claims" under the Plan. Though these
sections provide for the payment of attorneys fees and court costs to the
successful party, they seem to place the determination of "reasonable-
ness" squarely on the courts. We need only to look to the analogous
workmen's compensation system to see the effect such a requirement
would have on the courts. Workmen's compensation litigation handled
before boards is voluminous and protracted, but when courts, rather than
boards are involved to solve disputes, as in Texas, it consumes eight
times more of the court's time and resources. 27 Workmen's compensation
has been called "deceptively simple" and "litigiously prolific" even by
the Supreme Court.28 Our experience with workmen's compensation
has shown that court costs, lawyers' fees and court congestion tend to
increase rather than decrease as a consequence of no-fault develop-
ment.29 With direct recourse to the courts provided in the Pennsylvania
Plan for settlement of disputes, the effect on our judicial system will be
simply a change from fault determination to solving questions involving
"reasonableness of claims," "seventy percent disability," and "severe
disfigurement."
COSTS
Under the fault system, the total systems costs were $2.07 for each
dollar in net benefits received from the insurer.8 0 These figures are in
sharp contrast to nearly eighty-two cents on the premium dollar paid
26. Markoff, Compensation Without Fault and the Keeton-O'Connell Plan: A Critique,
43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 175, 193 (1968).
27. Danzig, The Fault with "No Fault," 7 TRIAL LAWYERS Q. 4 (Summer 1970).
28. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 US. 469, 479 (1947).
29. Comment, Faults in No-Fault Insurance Plans, 6 LAND AND WATER REv. 771
(1971).
30. REPORT OF THE AmrCAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON AuTOMoBILE
ACCIDENT REPARATIONS 151 (1969).
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out to claimnants under private life, health and non-occupational ac-
cident insurance, and nearly seventy cents on the premium dollar paid
out to workmen's compensation claimants.3' One of the aims of the
Pennsylvania Plan is to reduce this cost-benefit ratio through the
enactment of a no-fault plan. To reduce payments to a reasonable
amount, the Pennsylvania Plan proposes a limitation on recovery of one
thousand dollars or eighty-five percent of each injured person's monthly
earnings, a maximum recovery of thirty-six thousand dollars for lost
earnings, funeral expenses only up to one thousand dollars in section 11,
and the almost complete removal of pain and suffering recovery dis-
cussed before.
The proponents of the Pennsylvania Plan are overly optimistic about
the cost reduction aspects of the plan as there are absolutely no present
statistics to support such a claim. The view that costs will rise is sup-
ported by the inevitable increase in administrative costs and overhead
as the burden of policing the system will now fall on the insurance
companies themselves.32 If the Plan would really cost less, the reason is
only that it takes away many rights people now enjoy. If rate reduction
is the only object, then truly the cheapest insurance would be no
insurance at all. Removing all benefits would correspondingly remove
all premiums.
If lower premiums do result, at least the motoring public has
received something from the Pennsylvania Plan in exchange for the
tort rights they give up. What of the non-driver who does not live in a
household where someone owns a car. The non-driver or pedestrian is
required to accept personal injury protection benefits under the
Pennsylvania Plan. He must accept the more limited and restricted
personal injury benefits in lieu of damages otherwise recoverable in
tort. He is in no way benefited by the anticipated lower premiums,
directly or indirectly.
A basic rule of tort law is that a party in an auto accident must bear
the loss entirely if he contributed in any way to his injury by want of
"due care." The reason for denying recovery for negligence is to induce
people to act more carefully. The Pennsylvania Plan provides recovery
regardless of fault. It is possible that the incentive to drive carefully
has been removed. The careless driver has no reason to correct his
driving habits since he does not have to pay anyway. Why should the
31. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTA & A. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE COSTS
AND PAYMENTS-STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATIONS 59 (1964).
32. Markoff, supra note 26, at 191.
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driver show responsibility behind the wheel when he is protected by
other people against liability? Research has shown that no-fault will
reduce deterrence and thus produce more accidents.3 3 The net effect
could be that costs will go even higher.
What of fraud under no-fault? The unwittnessed accident will be the
foundation for a new fradulent claim bonanza, again contributing to
increased costs. Any motorist who breaks his arm falling on the side-
walk coming out of the local bar need only allege hit and run and he
can recover for his injuries to the limits of the Pennsylvania Plan.
Section 3(2) almost encourages such claims as damages are recoverable in
an occurence involving a parked car if "such injury was sustained by a
person while occupying, entering into or alighting from such vehicle."
The fraudulent claimant doesn't even need the elusive hit and run
driver to collect. Under the present tort system, only three out of every
fifty thousand claims are fraudulent.34
Loss NOT COVERED
At least the consumer can be sure that his automobile insurance will
cover his medical, wage loss and all other "appropriate and reasonable"
expenses. This assumption may not be true. The representation that the
plan provides complete protection misleads the consumer. He will
overlook gaps in protection and lack needed coverage. The insured
under the Pennsylvania Plan will not be covered for damage to his car,35
for lost earnings in excess of one thousand dollars or eighty-five percent
of monthly earnings not to exceed thirty-six thousand dollars. Section 4
provides no protection for bodily injury or liability insurance for trips
outside of Pennsylvania. Section 9 mandates additional insurance for
suits claiming drunk driving or intentionally caused accidents. Even if
the driver is innocent he will need to be covered for the cost of a defense
to claims. He will also have to purchase "comprehensive" insurance, i.e.,
insurance covering theft, fire, "acts of God" and vandalism. The Penn-
sylvania Plan removes many claims traditionally covered in tort in-
83. DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT, FAULT-A DETERRENT TO HIGHWAY
ACCIDENTS (no. 10, 1969).
34. Fuchsberg, A Lawyer Looks at Proposed Changes, 51 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 158, 161
(1967).
35. Even though section 4 provides coverage for all damage to property, real or
personal, section 19 provides that the motorist is not required to maintain insurance with
respect to property damage to his vehicle. Failure to secure such insurance, however,
constitutes a waiver of the right to recover for damages to his vehicle.
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surance. The unwary policyholder could find himself paying out of his
own pocket unless he provides for these deficiencies in coverage.
COLLATERAL SOURCE
Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Plan states that recovery under the
plan will be reduced by collateral sources such as unemployment com-
pensation and workmen's compensation. This section further provides
that all other policies of insurance such as hospitalization and wage
continuation may contain exclusive provisions for the amount of re-
covery received under the Plan. Proponents of the no-fault system con-
tend that the collateral source rule in tort law which allows the victim to
receive compensation from health and wage continuation plans in addi-
tion to recovery for damages received in the accident breeds double
compensation and waste. Claimants under the Pennsylvania Plan will be
paying into all these collateral sources only to learn that they cannot re-
ceive benefits from them under no-fault. The more comprehensive the
collateral coverage, the less value received from it. It is obvious that the
Pennsylvania Plan prefers the negligent and improvident to the care-
full and thrifty.3 6 The costs of workmen's compensation and unemploy-
ment compensation should also rise since no-fault will increase the
number of victims entitled to recover for medical and economic loss.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
Although section 19 of the Pennsylvania Plan does not require the
Plan to cover property damage to the motor vehicle, section 21 provides
that such insurance shall be made available to the policyholder. This
additional insurance will provide payment "without regard to fault"
to the owner of the motor vehicle whose damages exceed one hundred
dollars. Section 22 could impair the Plan's ability to lower insurance
costs since it provides that if this optional no-fault vehicle insurance is
not purchased, the motorist waives all rights to recover damages for
his auto. As much as two-thirds of the automobile premium is spent
for property damage, not bodily injury coverage, and more than ten
times as many people incur damage to their cars as incur personal
injury.37 A change in the reparation system from tort liability to no
36. Markoff, supra note 26, at 188-89.
37. Ring, No Fault Auto Insurance: Hoax or Cure?, 52 CHi. BAR REc. 451, 456 (1971).
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fault, therefore, does not attack the real source of high insurance costs.
The design of cars must be improved to control the ever increasing
automobile repair costs and something must be done on the accident
prevention level. These factors are the cause of high repair costs and
until the public turns its attention to solving them, the cost of auto-
mobile property damage insurance cannot be reduced. The Penn-
sylvania Plan covers "all damage to property, real and personal" and on
an optional basis, no-fault recovery of repair costs on the motor
vehicle. Claims forseeably could increase for vehicle damage and the
net result can only be an increase in the cost of providing damage in-
surance on a no-fault basis.
MANDATORY RATE REDUCTION
No-fault has been equated with lower insurance costs to the insurer
and lower costs to the insured. Cost savings were predicted at twenty-
five percent by the Keeton-O'Connell Plan.38 Overlooked in this pre-
diction is the fact that this reduction can only be achieved if present
rates are adequate. Today's rates are ten to fifteen percent inadequate in
most states.3 9 Assuming that lower costs would result from the enactment
of a no-fault plan, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts included in
their no-fault law an across the board fifteen percent reduction in
insurance rates. One would assume that through increased efficiency and
reduction of "waste" inherent in a no-fault plan, this reduction in rates
would easily be met by the insurance carriers. In Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance4 this reduction was declared
confiscatory and unconstitutional. The plan required a fifteen percent
reduction in rates for automobile insurance including property damage.
This across the board rate reduction caused the insurance underwriters
in Massachusetts to suffer a loss in excess of thirty-four million dollars
the first year of operation under the new plan. The court found that
insurance companies have a right to rates which will not force them out
of business. Even before the reduction was struck down, at least five
major insurers announced their decision to stop writing insurance in
the state of Massachusetts if the provisions went unchanged. 41
38. KEETON AND O'CONNELL, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 119 (1968).
39. WISE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: WHICH ROAD TOWARD REFORM?, AMERICAN MUTUAL
ALLIANCE PAMPHILEr (Nov. 20, 1968).
40. 263 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1970).
41. See lIJ. Report Calls Massachusetts No-Fault Plan A "Market Disaster," NATIONAL
UNDERwRITER, (Sept. 11, 1970).
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The Massachusetts experience with mandatory rate reduction high-
lights difficulties which could arise from section 25 of the Pennsylvania
Plan. The Plan requires a reduction of at least ten percent in the total
cost of coverage required in section 9 of the Plan including the optional
vehicular property damage insurance. If this reduction produces the
same loss pattern experienced in Massachusetts, a serious question arises
as to its constitutionality. The courts in Pennsylvania, in reviewing
insurance rates, have stated:
The government cannot insist upon insurance rates so low that
only the most efficient companies can survive. This would violate
the entire concept of competition and free enterprise and probably
result in an unconstitutional taking of property of a great number
of companies. 42
Should the mandatory reduction in the Pennsylvania Plan produce the
same economic effect as the Massachusetts provision, it would be struck
down as unconstitutional. Since the Pennsylvania Plan lacks a sever-
ability clause, the entire act would be declared unconstitutional for the
confiscatory nature of section 25. The legislature considering this Act
should look into a possible alternative to section 25. Based on the pre-
ceding analysis of the Massachusetts Plan, three possible approaches
are suggested: Before consideration of the Pennsylvania Plan, undertake
studies to determine the effect a ten percent reduction would have on
insurers, drop section 25 entirely, or at the very least include a sever-
ability clause to prevent the entire Pennsylvania Plan from being de-
clared unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Though section 25 presents a constitutional issue, the Act itself
raises serious constitutional questions. The Pennsylvania Plan places
limitations on recovery in personal injury actions. These limitations
were specifically considered by the drafters of the Constitution. The
Pennsylvania Constitution provides for limitation of payments under
workmen's compensation and goes on to say:
[B]ut in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount
to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to
42. Pennsylvania Insurance Dep't v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. Super. 221, 239, 173 A.2d
811 (1961).
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.'persons or property in case of death from such injuries, the right of
action shall survive. 43
Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Plan severely limits recovery for pain and
suffering and such limitation is prohibited except in workmen's com-
pensation. The Supreme Court has interperted this section of the
Constitution dealing with recovery limitation in De Jesus v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company44 and stated:
[w]e now specifically find that the purpose of Section 18, as
amended, was to permit the General Assembly to enact a workmen's
compensation program, but to preclude the enactment of general
''legislation covering injuries other than those arising in the course
of employment. 45
It would appear from this decision that the legislature, in drafting the
Pennsylvania Plan, has engaged in an act which has been declared
violative of the Constitution of the State of Pennsylvania. Not only do
serious deficiencies exist in the Pennsylvania Plan based on the no-fault
theory, but the plan itself is an unconstitutional use of legislative
power and could only be passed after a constitutional amendment was
approved by the voters of this state.
MISCELLANEOUS
The Pennsylvania Plan covers in section 4 "every action to recover
for damage sustained in a motor vehicle accident occurring in Penn-
sylvania or to which the laws of Pennsylvania as to damages is ap-
plicable." This section raises two issues: Since there is no statute of
limitations in the act, who can recover and what effects will the act
have on interstate accidents? Since a statute of limitations is not pro-
vided in the Pennsylvania Plan, an expense related to an accident ten
years ago can be recovered under the Plan. The effect this will have on
insurance costs and actuarial studies to determine risk cannot be
minimized. The insurer will have no means of determining the number
or cost of claims he will be required to pay under the Plan. He will be
required to take a "wait and see" approach hoping that premiums will
cover any unexpected or unprovided for claims.
The application of the Pennsylvania Plan to interstate accidents
43. PA. CONST. Art. 3 § 18.
44. 439 Pa. 180, 268 A.2d 924 (1970).
45. Id. at 184.
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should be of concern to all drivers in our highly mobile society. The
following example should provide some indication of the consequences
of a Pennsylvania resident colliding with a resident of a "fault" state.46
Throughout the example we will assume that Ohio is a state with a
"fault" system. Should the Ohio resident drive into Pennsylvania and
hit a tree, his injuries would be paid by the Pennsylvania Plan from
the assigned claims fund provided for in section 23. This fund is paid
for by the Pennsylvania, not the Ohio motorist, thus the Pennsylvania
motorist pays for the Ohio recovery. Should an Ohio resident drive into
Pennsylvania and hit a resident, both parties would collect no-fault in
Pennsylvania. The Ohio resident, however, would also retain his right
of action in Ohio. Here the Pennsylvania resident could pay even more.
The assigned claims fund paid for by Pennsylvania drivers compensates
the Ohio motorist. The Ohio resident still has the right to bring a tort
action in Ohio and raise the fault issue. If the Pennsylvania resident
was "negligent" the Ohio courts could render a judgment against him.
The Pennsylvania resident would then pay for this judgment and any
accompanying court costs or attorneys' fees from his own pocket. The
Pennsylvania Plan will provide no coverage for a tort action brought in
another state. Finally, if a Pennsylvania resident drives into Ohio and
hits an Ohio resident, the Pennsylvania resident would recover under
no-fault but the Ohio resident is free to bring a separate tort action
against him in Ohio. Again the Pennsylvania resident is subject to
tort litigation and possible liability. Again the Pennsylvania resident
must pay attorneys' fees for his defense. And again the Pennsylvania
Plan pays him nothing for this tort action. It appears that the out of
state driver who is fortunate enough to have an accident in a no-fault
state gets paid twice. He receives payment under no-fault, and should it
be determined he is not "at fault," he can recover again in his home
state. The costs of this double recovery fall on the no-fault driver.
CONCLUSION
The automobile accident reparation problem will not be solved by
no-fault plans. They toy with the end result of automobile accidents but
do nothing to correct the cause of those accidents. If the aim is lower
rates, they can be lowered by meaningful highway safety legislation,
46. Comment, supra note 29, at 783.
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safer cars and highways.47 The Federal Government is trying to require
production of cars which will not turn into a mass of twisted metal from
a collision at walking speed. This will reduce automobile insurance
costs far more than the elimination of "pain and suffering." The hard
core accident producer must be legislated off our highways. Penn-
sylvania retains a contributory negligence system for tort recovery.
Greater protection of the accident victim could result from a change to
a comparative negligence system. At least even the careless driver will
receive something. A serious problem in the fault system arises in the
case of the seriously injured. When costs which the victim must pay
himself begin to mount, the victim is under pressure to settle the claim
and receive payment even if that settlement is less than what the victim
would have been entitled to receive. This problem is being solved by
more than eighty percent of the nation's insurance companies who have
adopted a program of advancing payments to innocent victims of auto-
mobile accidents. 4 The injured party is only asked to sign a receipt
stating the payments are to be credited to any future settlement or
judgment. Perhaps the basic problem in the present tort system, as
viewed by the drafters of the Pennsylvania Plan, is the concept of
"fault." There is no reason why an individual should not pay for the
consequences of his act. This is a fundamental principle in our legal
system. In some cases the innocent party is hurt, yet, the amount of
first party coverage from sources other than automobile insurance
should provide sufficient compensation to the victim unable because of
carelessness to recover under the fault system.
The Pennsylvania legislature has before it a comprehensive and all
inclusive no-fault plan. It is probably as complete a plan as any it is
compared to in the Appendix. It provides for costs incurred in litigating
a claim refused by the insurer, it provides penalties for arbitrary refusal
to pay claims, it does not require the insured to compensate the other
driver by making the insured use up all collateral source benefits and it
provides unlimited recovery for economic loss with the aforementioned
exceptions. It is suggested that if Pennsylvania must have a no-fault
system, some attention should be given to the plans outlined in the
Appendix. Only the Pennsylvania and the American Insurance As-
sociation Plans foreclose the right to sue in tort. Only these two plans
make pain and suffering nonexistent. The answer to the automobile
47. Ghiardi and Kirchner, Automobile Insurance: An Analysis of the Massachusetts
Plan, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1135 (1970).
48. Ring, supra note 37, at 454.
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reparation problem might be found in a combination fault-no-fault
plan. A plan which provides no-fault coverage for a limited amount
while allowing the seriously injured to maintain an action in tort. The
Keeton-O'Connell Plan allows tort recovery when medical damages
exceed ten thousand dollars, and allows suit for pain and suffering when
tort damages for pain and suffering exceed five thousand dollars. The
Pennsylvania Plan is as pure a no-fault plan as any it is compared to. It
rules out almost completely tort recovery. Perhaps the legislature
should consider an alternative fault-no-fault plan which would provide
the desired no-fault recovery yet preserve the right to sue in tort for the
seriously injured.
The tort system does contain flaws. The approach to a more equitable
system, however, should not merely be based on how quickly we can
scrap the present system but on the development of a system which will
provide an equitable solution to many justified complaints. We should
look carefully into a Plan which destroys our common law right to
pain and suffering in exchange for a promise of quick payment and
lower cost. The no-fault proposal simply does not give the insured
more coverage for less money. In fact, we can only hope there is no
extra charge for the reduced protection we would receive.
EUGENE M. FIGNAR
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